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Public Opinion and
National Prestige

The Politics of Canadian Army
Participation in the Invasion of
Sicily, 1942-1943
Brandey Barton

T

he participation of Canadian troops in the
Sicilian campaign of July and August 1943
marked a distinctive shift in Canada’s war policy,
and significantly influenced the employment
of the army until the end of hostilities in May
1945. Advocates of Canadian participation in
the campaign argued that the overseas army,
which had been on garrison duty in Britain since
1939, needed to gain combat experience. Yet it
was largely due to political reasons and concerns
with prestige rather than military necessity that
prompted the Canadian government to bring
increasing, and ultimately effective, pressure
to bear on the British government to include a
Canadian infantry division and tank brigade in
Operation “Husky” – the invasion of Sicily.

Prior to 1943, the government’s main concern
had been to avoid any circumstances that
might lead to overseas conscription.1 The heavy
casualties that might make overseas conscription
necessary could only be the result of sustained
action by the land forces. For that reason
Mackenzie King, the Canadian prime minister,
had been content not to push the senior Allied
powers, especially Britain, to find combat roles
for the Canadian Army which was in position to
defend the British Isles. King had been happy not
to participate at all in the strategic deliberations
of the great powers. When Sir Robert Borden,
Canada’s conservative prime minister during the
First World War, had in 1917-1918 demanded a
Canadian voice in British strategy, the price had

been increased military commitments and the
imposition of conscription that severely divided
the country.2 King desperately wanted to avoid a
repeat of that situation.
By the fall of 1942 the army had been in Britain
for three years. The danger of an Axis invasion
of the British Isles had long past, and the only
serious combat the army had seen in Europe was
the disastrous single day assault on Dieppe on
19 August 1942.3 General A.G.L. McNaughton,
the commander of the army, was not greatly
concerned by the lack of combat experience.
His primary objective was to make sure the
Canadian army was not broken up, and remained
as a united, national formation for the final
assault on Germany. By the fall of 1942, many
disagreed with this policy. The United States
had only entered the war at the end of 1941,
over two years after Canada, and yet its army
was already fighting in the Pacific and preparing
for large-scale operations in Europe. Many
Canadians, including influential journalists,
were asking why Canada’s army was not more
active.4 J.L. Ralston, the minister of National
Defence, and many senior army officers, other
than McNaughton, were also keen for early action
by any means possible. They were concerned
about the morale of the troops in England, and
feared that Canada’s army might in fact miss out
on any substantial share in combat, which would
be a crippling blow to the reputation of the armed
forces, and to Canada’s international influence.
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Winston Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff meet with
Mackenzie King and the Canadian War Cabinet:
1. J.L. Ilsley; 2. Sir J. Martin; 3. Lord Leathers; 4. Churchill; 5. Field
Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Br.); 6.
Admiral Sir A. Cunningham, Chief of the Naval Staff (Br.); 7. Air Chief
Marshal Sir C. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff (Br.); 8. Field Marshal J.
Dill; 9. General Sir Hastings Ismay; 10. Air Marshal R. Leckie, Chief
of the Air Staff (Cdn.); General M.A. Pope; 12. Lieutenant-General
J.C. Murchie, Chief of the General Staff (Cdn.); 13. Vice Admiral G.C.
Jones, Chief of the Naval Staff (Cdn.); 14. Louis St. Laurent; 15. C.G.
Power; 16. T.A. Crerar; 17. Mackenzie King; 18. A.D.P. Heeney; 19
J.L. Ralston; 20. Angus L. Macdonald.

Ralston and Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart,
chief of the general staff, put the need for early
employment of any substantial part of the
army directly to General Alan F. Brooke, Chief
of Imperial General Staff (CIGS),`1 during a
visit to the United Kingdom in October 1942.5
Ralston asked Brooke to make sure Churchill
understood that “there were no strings on the
employment of the Canadian Army” and “that the
Government of Canada wished it to be used where
it would make the greatest contribution.”6 Before
meeting with Brooke, Ralston and Stuart met
privately with Vincent Massey, the Canadian High
Commissioner, to make sure that the Canadian
government’s senior representative in Britain
was fully prepared to cooperate in the effort to
persuade the British to find employment for the
army in 1943.7 It is particularly significant that
the minister of National Defence and the chief

of the general staff went to Massey and General
Brooke before they had explained to General
McNaughton that they were pushing for an
active role for any part of the Canadian Army.
Normally, McNaughton, as the commander of
the Canadian Army in Britain would have been
closely associated with any such appeal.
Ralston’s view that the army might be sidelined
seemed to gain weight when in November 1942 the
US Army joined the British Army for Operation
“Torch,” the large-scale invasion of north-western
Africa. 8 Canada did not even receive prior
notification of “Torch.” Mackenzie King was not
particularly concerned by this. However, the
situation changed in March 1943 when an urgent
personal message from British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill arrived explaining that Canada
was to lose priority on trans-Atlantic shipping.
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The continued insistence of Ralston
and Stuart that active employment be
found for at least part of the Canadian
forces and the support of the full
government that King, however great
his private misgivings, had provided
since the shipping crisis in March, paid
off on 23 April 1943. General Brooke
asked General McNaughton if the
Canadian Government would be willing
to commit one infantry division and one
tank brigade to Operation “Husky.”11
McNaughton sent a telegram to General
Stuart requesting permission from the
government for Canadian troops to
participate in the operation. As a result
of discussions by the War Committee
and decisions it had previously reached,
Mackenzie King gave his approval after
reviewing McNaughton’s telegram. King
recorded in his diary that night that it
was a shame that McNaughton’s army
was to be broken up but felt that what
would be accomplished would more than
offset the division of the army. Within 48
hours McNaughton was able to inform
the CIGS that his government had
authorized participation in the proposed
operation.12

Shortly after midnight, 10 July 1943, Mackenzie
King announced to his country that Canadian
armed forces, along with those of Britain and
the United States were “in the forefront of an
attack which has as its ultimate objective the
unconditional surrender of Italy and Germany.”
He continued, “All of Canada will be justifiably
proud to know that units of the Canadian Army
are a part of the Allied forces engaged in this
attack.” 13 The landing by the 1st Canadian
Infantry Division on Pachino Beach marked “the
beginning of a new phase of war”14 for Canada’s
army, after four long years of waiting and training
in the United Kingdom. Logical as it might seem
that the prime minister should make this early
announcement of a major national military
initiative, he had in fact encountered enormous

LAC PA 132648

Churchill told King that because the Canadian
Army would not be involved in major operations
in the near future, the trans-Atlantic shipping
that had been assigned to transport Canadian
troops needed to complete the organization of the
overseas army would instead be assigned to US
Army Air Force personnel.9 Ralston was furious
and his view that the changed shipping priority
indicated the need to ensure early action for any
substantial part of the army won considerable
support in Cabinet. King, in what his diary
suggests was one of the more difficult decisions
of his career, began to shift his support away
from McNaughton’s view that any major mission
must be only for the whole of the army as a large
national formation. The prime minister sent a
message to Churchill urging that employment be
found in the Mediterranean theatre for
any part of the army.10

General A.G.L. McNaughton, the commander of
the army, was a proponent of keeping the army
together to maintain its national character.
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difficulties in receiving clearance to do so from
the Allied high command.
As the countdown to Operation “Husky”
proceeded and plans were finalized, General
Stuart informed Canadian military authorities in
London that the government wished to provide as
much information as possible about operations
in Sicily to the Canadian public as soon as was
feasible.15 King was anxious that the participation
of Canadian forces in “Husky” be known by
the public immediately since involvement in
an operation of this magnitude was long in
coming and important to the Canadian war
effort. The resulting Sicilian crisis, a crisis on
the prestige front as Massey referred to it,16 was
a complicated affair, spanning many days and
embroiling military and political authorities on
three continents.
On 7 July, with the invasion of Sicily only days
away, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ)
in Ottawa received from the Canadian Joint
Staff (CJS) Washington advance copies of the
announcements to be released after the operation
began.17 From his headquarters in Algiers, North
Africa, General Eisenhower, commander-in-chief

of Allied Forces, proposed three announcements:
(a) a communique for general release, (b) an avis
to the people of France and, (c) a proclamation
to the Italian people. The immediate reaction of
both Ralston and Mackenzie King was that the
drafts were “thoroughly objectionable” because
they made no mention of Canada.18 Lester B.
Pearson, then a senior official with the Canadian
legation in Washington and a key player in the
crisis, later recalled that the response of his
government, “was swift and decisive, references
to Anglo-American forces [had to] be changed
to American-British-Canadian forces.” 19 The
original proclamation to the Italian people began
“on behalf of the governments of the United
States and Great Britain, the Allied Forces
are occupying Italian territory” and the avis,
which mentioned only “the Anglo-American
forces,”20 were unacceptable. National Defence
Headquarters requested that Canadian Military
Headquarters (CMHQ) in London and the CJS
in Washington discuss the matter with their
British and American colleagues and request
that references to Canada and Canadian forces
be included. NDHQ made these inquiries in both
Washington and London since the announcements
regarding the landings were to be released in

26
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General McNaughton (right) talks to Major D.E. Walker, while Major-General Guy Simonds, commander
of 1st Canadian Infantry Division (left) and Brigadier Walford look on, Sicily, 20 August 1943.
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Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Air Marshal Lloyd S. Breadner, Mrs. Winston Churchill, Vice-Admiral
Percy W. Nelles and Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart at the Quebec Conference, August 1943.

both Allied capitals.21 The CJS replied on 8
July that the British Joint Staff Mission (BJSM)
recommended that Eisenhower should not make
the broadcast of the proclamation and instead
that the announcement should be made by the
British prime minister and American president.
In addition, the CJS reported that BJSM had
transmitted the Canadian concerns to the British
high command in London. Eisenhower was
then notified by the British Joint Staff Mission
that the announcements should be released in
Canada as well as Washington and London.22 A
telegram from Canadian Joint Staff Washington
to National Defence Headquarters dated 9 July
confirmed that the instructions had been sent to
Eisenhower.23
On 7 July, Vincent Massey had received early
confirmation that the proclamation to the
Italian people was to be made by Churchill and
Roosevelt, not Eisenhower. Massey reported
to Canada that the proposed text read: “At this
moment the combined armed forces of the United
States and Great Britain are under command of
General Eisenhower… ”24 Massey also explained
that for reasons of military security it was
difficult to mention Canadian participation in
the operation. However, Canadian concerns were

sympathetically received by British authorities
and every effort was to be made to find a suitable
solution.25
On 8 July the United States War Department
informed the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington
that authorization had been given by Eisenhower’s
headquarters stating that Eisenhower had
agreed that King could make reference to the
participation of Canadian troops in Operation
“Husky” 24 hours after the landings started. The
British War Office informed CMHQ on 9 July that
to prevent any aid from being given to the enemy,
no announcement regarding the participation of
Canadian forces could be made at the time of
the landings. 26 As a result, King believed that
the British were being unnecessarily difficult.27
However, Mackenzie King was wrong about the
British, as Massey felt that distinct progress was
being made and recorded in his diary that he
was confident Canada would be mentioned in the
communiques and the proclamation.28
On 8 July King informed Massey that if it were
not possible to mention Canadian forces for
security reasons, then the proclamation should
refer to only “Allied Forces.” Additionally, if the
proclamation was to be issued by Churchill and
27
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Colonel J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, talking to General P.J. Montague and Vincent Massey at Hendon
airport after flying in from Italy, 4 October 1944.

Roosevelt then King felt he should be included
with the British prime minister and American
president in the announcement. King requested
that the text of the agreed upon proclamation
be available in Canada for simultaneous release
by the Canadian prime minister. He stressed to
Massey, “the importance of the Prime Minister
being in a position to inform Canadians that
their forces are at last in action.”29 This strong
statement indicates the extent to which Massey’s
report of 7 July, from British sources, regarding
Eisenhower’s security concerns about mentioning
Canada, had left King with the impression that the
British were not helping to exert enough pressure
on Eisenhower. King, in fact, was convinced that
the British were the main problem.
For this reason, King turned to the US president,
appealing for his personal intervention in an
evening phone call on 8 July. This was an unusual
initiative, of the kind reserved for critical issues
touching on fundamental national interests, and is
compelling proof of the importance King attached
to the recognition of Canada’s military effort. King
reached the White House and spoke with Harry
Hopkins, the president’s trusted aide, who was
then in the middle of dinner with Roosevelt.30
The prime minister arranged with Hopkins
for Lester B. Pearson, the minister counselor

of the Canadian Legation in Washington, to
meet with the president at once to discuss the
situation. Pearson saw Roosevelt at 2140 hours
that evening and reported to Ottawa shortly
thereafter that both Hopkins and the president
were “most friendly and sympathetic” regarding
the Canadian situation. The two understood that
any mention of “armed forces” in statements
regarding “Husky” that did not refer to Canadian
forces alongside British-American forces would
be objectionable to Canada. Pearson reported
that after some thought Roosevelt agreed specific
mention of Canada was the preferable course
of action and that he would take the necessary
steps to ensure Canadians were, indeed, included
in any statement made about the launch of the
operation.31 Later that same evening King sent a
telegram to Massey outlining what was discussed
between Pearson and Roosevelt in Washington.
He told Massey that the president had assured
Pearson that there would be plenty of time to
consider the Canadian point of view and make the
necessary changes.32 The implication of King’s
message was that in sharp contrast to the British
the Americans were being extraordinarily helpful.
In fact, British authorities had already taken
significant action in response to Massey’s
complaints. The War Office in London had
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Department in Washington beginning, “BritishUnited States-Canadian forces have launched
an attack on Sicily.”38 Lester Pearson on his way
home heard a similar report on the radio in
Washington stating: “British, American, (pause)
and Canadian troops have commenced landing
operations in Sicily.”39 This announcement from
the War Department in Washington came as a
surprise since Eisenhower’s communique had
referred only to “Allied Forces.” Nonetheless, it
is important to note that the avis to the French
people made reference to the participation of
Canadian forces.40 Upon hearing about the radio
broadcast from Washington, Prime Minister King
decided he could issue his own statement to the
country. He arranged for the statement to be
given to the press immediately and at 0800 hours
read his statement on the radio:41 “All Canada
will be justifiably proud to know that units of
the Canadian Army are a part of the allied force
engaged in the attack.”42
Vincent Massey, on the morning of 10 July,
heard the announcement of the Sicilian landing,

LAC C 13260

telegraphed Eisenhower informing him that
the British chiefs of staff had arranged for the
Canadians to be mentioned in the ChurchillRoosevelt proclamation and that it was assumed
similar mention of the Canadians would be
made in the avis to the French.33 On 9 July
NDHQ received a telegram from Canadian Joint
Staff Washington confirming that “Canadian
participation in ‘Husky’ [was] to be mentioned in
joint message from President and Prime Minister
to the Italian people.” The telegram further stated:
“assume that Canadians will be mentioned by
name in the avis…to the people of Metropolitan
France.”34 In his telegram to King on 9 July,
Massey confirmed that he had seen telegrams
exchanged between London and Washington and
that the proclamation issued by Roosevelt and
Churchill would read the “combined forces of
the United States, Great Britain and Canada.”
However, Massey reiterated to Mackenzie King
that for military reasons the Combined Chiefs of
Staff were reluctant to mention the presence of
Canadians during an early stage of the operation.
They had only agreed to do so because of the
special circumstances King outlined in his
telegram of 8 July. 35 King’s reply to Massey
revealed that he was not impressed with Massey’s
telegram. He did acknowledge the efforts that
were being made to change the wording of
the avis and the proclamation. However, one
paragraph of King’s telegram clearly reflected
his mood:
The objection…to associating the Prime Minister
of Canada with the Proclamation does not
impress us. This…does not accord with
President’s statement…that there would be
ample time to have consideration given to our
views in preparation of Proclamation to the
Italian people.36

S h o r t l y a f t e r m i d n i g h t o n 1 0 J u l y,
Eisenhower’s communique was issued from
Allied Headquarters in Algiers announcing
the start of operations in Sicily but it made
reference only to “Allied Forces.” 37 Only ten
minutes later, however, King received word at
his residence that a flash had come from the War
J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, shaking
hands with W.L. Mackenzie King after proposing a toast
to “Our Leader” at a banquet celebrating Mr. King’s 25th
anniversary as leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, 7
August 1944.
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Mackenzie King, Winston Churchill and Franklin D.
Roosevelt pose for a photograph during the Quebec
Conference, August 1943.

LAC C 29466

ended and “it would have been one of those fatal
omissions that nothing could make good.”45

which gave full recognition to the participation
of Canadian troops, and felt that the wording of
the announcement was largely due to the efforts
of his office over the previous days.43 Mackenzie
King, on the other hand, believed that were it not
for his late night phone call to the White House,
Canadians would not have been mentioned in
any of the statements announcing the beginning
of “Husky.” As he wrote in his diary, “So much
for Britain.”44 King, renowned for his caution,
calculation and reserve, was so deeply upset
that he could not contain his indignation. Upon
returning to Kingsmere, his country estate, on
10 July, he found that the Governor General and
Princess Alice were visiting. Before they left, King
told them about the exchange of telegrams and
the efforts that his government had gone to, to get
consent from the British to announce Canadian
participation in the “Husky” operation. King
explained how quickly the American president
had agreed to the mention of Canadian troops
and that he (King), “would have been wholly
discredited…had [he] not taken the stand [he]
did at midnight.” King freely drew extreme
conclusions: “…had no announcement come
about Canadians participating from their own
government, [his] political career would have”

On Monday morning, 12 July, Mackenzie King
announced to the Canadian House of Commons
that operations in Sicily had commenced and
that Canadians were indeed participating. King
also assured the House that since the outbreak
of the war the government had insisted Canadian
forces, whether in whole or in part, should be
used when and where they could make the best
contribution.46 On 13 July the prime minister
and the minister of National Defence, were
questioned in the House about whether the
inclusion of Canadian troops in Sicily meant that
the army had been broken up. Ralston replied
by reiterating what he had said previously in the
House on 13 May 1943: “It has always been and
still is our policy that the Canadian army in whole
or in part is available to be used wherever and
for whatever task would best serve the common
cause.”47
In the House on 14 July the minister
was asked if he could reveal the name of the
commanding officer of the Canadian forces in
Sicily. Ralston replied that for reasons of security,
he could not provide that kind of information
until Eisenhower gave permission to do so. R.B.
Hanson, leader of the Opposition protested that
“It is a remarkable situation, because I have
read in the press the names of all the allied
commanders and Canada is just not in that
picture…I hope there is a Canadian commander
of some prominence and standing…”48 Ralston
corrected Hanson, reminding the members that
none of the names of the Allied divisional or even
corps commanders had been released.49
This was typical of Ralston’s normally
cautious public statements. Uncharacteristically,
however, he then let some of his frustration show:
“I do not want to add fuel to the flame of public
desire, but I must say that sometimes I am irked
at the security regulations which it is necessary
to enforce.”50 More unusually still, Mr. King then
proceeded to vent more fully and stated that he
had made his announcement to the Canadian
people Friday night in spite of being asked

30
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15/iss2/5

8

Barton: Public Opinion and National Prestige

to release the name of the Canadian commander
and that it had not been done up until that point
because no commanders of any nationality
had been named except for army commanders
and higher. Churchill did admit that perhaps
an exception should have been made for the
Canadians because of the long period that they
had been waiting to see action, but at the same
time, asked King to understand how difficult it
was to keep everything straight.60

not to make any mention of Canadian forces
participating in “Husky” until late Saturday.51
King continued to show his anger in the House
the next day, and in fact related the full details of
what he saw as a sordid slight against Canada by
Britain in contrast to the help he received from
Washington.52
King wrote in his diary that night that, “it
was really unbelievable that with all Canada has
done in this war for Britain, that our position
should have been so completely and deliberately
overlooked by the British…” 53 Both Vincent
Massey and Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Stacey, then
the head of the army’s overseas historical section
and privy to high-level information, recorded in
their diaries on 16 July that King’s statement
in the House which had blamed the British had
caused quite a stir at CMHQ in London. Military
authorities there thought that the British War
Office had been fully cooperative and had made
every effort on the behalf of Canadians, as had the
Americans, to convince Eisenhower to mention
the Canadian forces. Stacey went even further,
suggesting that there was the possibility that
Canadian relations with the British would suffer
as a result.54 King’s attack on British military
authorities was certainly an embarrassment to
Canadian military authorities. Churchill, upon
hearing of King’s statement was livid. 55

LAC C 47565

Malcolm MacDonald, the British High
Commissioner in Canada, recorded that many
people in Canada wrongly believed that once
Canadian troops were finally participating in
action, the British authorities had tried to prevent
the news of their participation from reaching the
public. He believed that Mackenzie King’s false
perception of events and his statement in the
House of Commons had fostered this belief.56
Like Stacey, MacDonald was also worried about
the effect on Anglo-Canadian relations.57 Winston
Churchill, in a telegram to King on 17 July, told
the Canadian prime minister that reports of his
suggestion that Canada got better treatment from
the United States than from Britain made for
“painful reading.”58 He expressed his unhappiness
that King had felt slighted but reiterated that the
Canadians were receiving ample press coverage
in the London papers.59 Churchill also informed
King that he had given the War Office instructions

The situation deteriorated further the
following day when Churchill received the full
text of Mackenzie King’s outburst in the House.
Churchill wrote to King that he could not accept
the position in which King had put him. He
was to be questioned about King’s statement in
the British Parliament the following Tuesday.
Churchill then asked the Canadian prime
minister for suggestions about how he should
answer the questions in Parliament. 61 King
did not reply directly to Churchill but instead
asked MacDonald what Churchill meant when
he said he could not accept the position. When
MacDonald replied with the obvious answer,
that Churchill could not accept the suggestion
the British authorities had opposed mentioning
Canadian forces, King became angry.62 King
informed MacDonald that if Churchill gave a
statement in parliament he would dissolve the
Canadian parliament and call an election. If that
were not enough, King argued he would not fight
the election on that one issue alone, but rather
on the, “treatment of Canada by the British
government, which had frequently forgotten

Churchill and King shake
hands during happier times.
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that Canada was a Dominion.” He suggested
that, “on matters of importance to Canada, [the
British] had ignored Canada’s rights as a free
member of the Commonwealth…” and that, “he
had sometimes permitted himself…to be ignored
as no Canadian Prime Minister should be…”63
That he had let himself be ignored was one
matter, but King was not prepared to stand idly
by while Canadian soldiers were put in a position
of inferiority when compared with their British
and American counterparts. That King would
suggest the British sometimes forgot Canada was
a Dominion is interesting. Since the outbreak of
the war, the Canadian government and military
authorities had been fighting to assert Canadian
independence and ensure that they remained
in control over Canadian troops. This episode
suggests volumes about the confused status of
not only the Canadian Army but the country as
well.
As King continued to rage, Malcolm
MacDonald pointed out that he had read all
the relevant correspondence and reported that
London’s attitude towards the Canadian situation
had been “as unexceptional as Washington’s.” In
fact, the two governments had actually cooperated
in sending instructions to Eisenhower’s
headquarters to carry out the request that
mention be made of Canadian participation in
the communiques about the start of operations
in Sicily.64 MacDonald further suggested that the
Canadian prime minister had misunderstood
the attitude of the British authorities and as a
result had been quite unfair to them, because in
reality, the British had been just as cooperative
as the Americans. MacDonald told King that in
all likelihood, the time difference between Ottawa
and London (as opposed to between Ottawa and
Washington) was the probable reason for the
perceived slowness of answers coming out of
London.
The next day, after having a chance to cool
down, King agreed to write a draft response
for Churchill and told MacDonald he no longer
wished to call an election if Churchill made
an unsatisfactory statement in the British
Parliament. Churchill found King’s statement too
long, but in his message to Parliament proposed
that no one in particular was to blame for the
misunderstanding and that the matter was
officially closed.65

The incident publicly showed Mackenzie
King at his worst. He was clearly wrong about
the attitude of the British and could have
done serious harm to the Anglo-Canadian
relationship. 66 Malcolm MacDonald believed
King never would have called a general election
but the incident made MacDonald realize the
seriousness of the situation and that irritation at
the treatment of Canada was widespread among
ministers and citizens of the country.67 Massey,
in addition, believed that King’s annoyance at the
situation was derived from a number of incidents
in the previous months which had disrupted
Anglo-Canadian relations and because it was only
a last minute intervention in both Washington and
London that led to the mention of Canadians in
the Churchill-Roosevelt proclamation. Massey felt
the situation was exasperated by the Canadian
prime minister’s hyper-sensitivity about AngloCanadian relations whereas the British prime
minister was insensitive. The entire situation
could have been avoided, Massey felt, if only
someone conscious of the Canadian sentiment
had reviewed the proclamation and pointed
out the omission of Canada.68 In a message to
Winston Churchill on 19 July, although he never
apologized to the British prime minister, King did
acknowledge that the British had indeed agreed
to the mention of Canadian forces.69
In the end, Mackenzie King supported
McNaughton for as long as he could but public
opinion and the fear of overseas conscription
eventually got the better of him. Clearly, it was an
agonizing decision to support Ralston, who had
no qualms about overseas conscription, rather
than McNaughton who was determined to avoid
it. King’s reluctance to make such a decision,
and the enormous strains on him, were evident
in the mixed messages he sent about what he
wanted for the Canadian Army and what he saw
as Canada’s place in the higher direction of the
war. The full extent of the strain he bore, and
the over-riding importance he had finally come
to attach to early action for the army, was clearly
evident in his thoroughly uncharacteristic public
outbursts in Parliament in July 1943, and his
unwillingness to make amends with Churchill
even days later, when normally anger would
have cooled. It was a particularly remarkable
incident because King was the exact reverse of
a passionate leader; invariably he was able to
contain his emotions in the service of larger and
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longer term political interests. In the matter
of war fighting, King had long been convinced
that his, and his government’s, interests were
best served by publicly promoting his warm
friendship with Churchill, whose popularity
in Canada was enormous. Privately, King’s
relationship with Churchill was very different as
their confrontations over recognition of the Royal
Canadian Navy’s leading part in the Battle of the
Atlantic and the creation of Royal Canadian Air
Force overseas units and formations shows.70
Ultimately, despite the important requirement
for combat experience, 1st Canadian Division
and, subsequently, I Canadian Corps were sent
to the Mediterranean for very different reasons,
rooted in domestic politics and questions of
national prestige. The government so forcefully
pushed for action that it did what Mackenzie
King had always been exceedingly reluctant to do
– dictate on what were arguably purely military
matters to senior Allied commanders. Sending
the division to Sicily also meant removing a
British division that had already begun training.
Sending a corps, including an armoured
division, to Italy, moreover, meant establishing
an additional headquarters where one was not
needed nor wanted.71 This is, of course, not to
say that the Canadian Army performed poorly
as a result of its government’s actions. On the
contrary, the army lived up to the reputation it
had established during the First World War; this,
rather paradoxically, was in fact the ultimate
reason why General McNaughton had wanted the
army to remain intact.
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